Could a hedonist come up with any reason as to why we should not plug into Nozick's Experience Machine?
The Experience Machine, to those unfamiliar, is a thought experiment designed by the American philosopher Robert Nozick (1938-2002). The hypothesis states that "superduper" (his word choice, not mine) neuroscientists have created a machine that allows the user to design their ideal life. One can program any experiences they want into the machine, and once they've perfected their course, they "plug in," rendering their body a useless mass, floating in a tub of nutrients that will sustain their vital functions. However, in their minds, they are living out a perfect life. So, the question becomes, should we plug in or not?
Here's what I had to say about the matter (and, to those of you paying attention, note that Robert Pirsig's quote from my first post surfaces again in the second half of the essay):
Robert Nozick argues that the concept of the experience machine undermines hedonism as a theory of well-being because it detaches the user from “reality,” and thereby prevents them from encountering “true” happiness, which is the singular cornerstone of hedonism. However, I disagree with Nozick's claim that the experience machine disproves the foundation of hedonism, and, in accordance with that argument, I believe the hedonist could easily find sufficient reasoning to plug into the experience machine.1 In my opinion, happiness is rooted in perception, a belief that leads to the conclusion that the concept of “false pleasures” does not actually exist. Furthermore, I am convinced that Nozick committed a fatal flaw in his construction of the experience machine. This error, by my logic, results in the disintegration of his argument.
The concept of happiness can be best expressed as a feeling, or an emotion.2 Various and numerous stimulants can elicit happiness, although a positive response to such a stimulus is grounded internally. That is to say, one feels happiness before they express it. Therefore, happiness is a reaction to perception, which is a deeply and unquestionably individualized entity. It is impossible to wake up in the morning and think for anyone but yourself. Furthermore, it is impossible to react to stimuli, either voluntarily or involuntarily, without employing our perceptions for guidance. Therefore, if a machine could control our every experience, taking into minute detail the sensation of every somatic and psychological stimuli, we as the controlled would react seamlessly, just as we do in the “real world.” Nozick claims that his experience machine does just that, an assertion which I believe weakens his argument to its breaking point. He explains that an experience machine user can program any life they please, but by doing so, they will become detached from “reality.” However, by allowing the user ultimate choice, and by citing that, once in the machine, one does not realize the boundaries of his cage, and finally by explaining that each event in the machine exists as perfectly accurate and consistent, he enables every user to formulate a happy, cogent life. Alas, Nozick's case's downfall lies in the machine's absolute accuracy, which makes it possible and natural to equate truth in the machine to “reality.”
This argument can be further supported by my invalidation of the concept of false pleasures. Consider the man unaware of his cheating wife. Though she is unfaithful, he loves her and believes their marriage is sound. This belief makes him happy, but is he truly living a good life according to the hedonist, since his happiness is built on a falsehood? I would argue he is, and, to prove this, draw on a quote from Robert M. Pirsig, written in his novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: "We [must] take a handful of sand from the endless landscape of awareness around us and call that handful of sand the world." Pirsig is demonstrating, correctly, that it is impossible to know everything. In conjunction with my previous argument against false pleasures, I would agree with Pirsig, and contend that if what we know (that is, what we believe) makes us happy, then we are genuinely happy, because without opposing evidence, our beliefs exist in our minds as truths.
By the previous logic, I also believe that hedonism stands as an acceptable theory of human well-being. When happiness is one's ultimate goal, well-being is had simply when happiness is attained. Hedonism comes under scrutiny, though, when the nature of happiness is questioned. Skeptics argue that there exist a number of varieties of happiness and contentment, and only the most true should satisfy the hedonist, for otherwise he has not achieved his ultimate goal. However, by explaining that our perception governs our reactions, and showing that the false pleasures argument is unsound, we can show that a hedonist can have happiness in the very moment that he experiences it, without having to question the validity of the happiness.
I find no reason as to why a hedonist should not plug into Nozick's Experience Machine, as the hedonist's ultimate goal is happiness. Nozick himself explains that happiness can be had in surplus in the machine, although it is not “true happiness” because of the machine's supposed inherent detachment from reality. However, by examining happiness as a function of perception, and by disproving the “false pleasures” argument, we make the experience machine available, without hesitation, to every person seeking happiness through a sublime life.
Notes:
- That is to say, the hedonist could not come up with any reason as to why we should not plug into Nozick's Experience Machine.
- A feeling cannot necessarily be equated to an emotion in every, or any, instance. However, it is my belief that every element of happiness can be likened to either a feeling or an emotion. The contentment that is experienced throughout the course of a “good day,” for example, typifies happiness as a feeling. However, the rush of joy that comes upon the receipt of an A+ on a difficult exam draws out happiness as an emotion.
